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Abstract 
One of the common criticisms of poverty alleviation programs is that the high 
share of administrative (nontransfer) costs substantially reduces the programs’ impact on 
poverty.  But very little empirical evidence exists on program costs.  For example, a 
recent extensive international review of targeted poverty alleviation programs in 
developing countries could find data on costs for only 32 out of the 111 program 
reviewed.  Even then, the numbers available were not always comparable.  In this paper, 
we present a detailed analysis of the cost structure of a program recently introduced in 
Mexico, called PROGRESA.  Our analysis shows how cost data can be used as the basis 
for an evaluation of the cost efficiency of anti-poverty programs. It cautions, however,  
that one must be very careful when interpreting cost numbers or undertaking comparisons 
across programs in order to avoid misleading conclusions.  Any credible analysis of a 
program’s cost efficiency must involve a detailed analysis of cost structure and not 
simply provide aggregate cost information.  We also highlight the importance of not 
neglecting private costs incurred by households in taking up transfers. 
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 1 
1.  Introduction 
It is now widely accepted that social safety nets play an important role in 
alleviating poverty and promoting development in developing countries (World Bank 
1997).  However, a common criticism of such programs is that a large proportion of the 
program budget is absorbed by nontransfer costs and thus never reaches the intended 
beneficiaries.
1  Any effect on poverty is thus offset by the high cost of achieving this 
impact, with obvious adverse consequences for the program’s overall cost-effectiveness.  
Yet little rigorous empirical evidence exists concerning the cost levels or structures of 
poverty alleviation programs in developing countries.  For example, in their review of 
targeted poverty alleviation programs in developing countries, Coady, Grosh, and 
Hoddinott (2004) could find some sort of cost data for only 32 of the 111 programs 
reviewed.  Moreover, the cost data available were far from comparable because they were 
calculated in different ways.  Sometimes the cost refers to administrative costs.  For other 
studies, it refers to the cost in terms of theft or other losses.  Where the focus is on 
administrative costs, it is often unclear at what stage of maturity the program was 
observed—whether the cost relates to the program to date or to the most recent year for 
which data were available.  A point made in this paper is that such detail is necessary if 
one is to make any sensible comparison of cost levels across programs.  
In this paper, we provide a detailed analysis of the levels and structure of the 
various cost components of PROGRESA, a poverty alleviation program introduced in 
August 1997 across rural Mexico, with the objective of showing how such an analysis 
can be used to evaluate and compare the cost efficiency of poverty programs.  Since the 
total budget is made up of the sum of administrative costs and transfers, it is common to 
analyze this aspect of cost effectiveness in terms of the cost of transferring a unit of funds 
to beneficiaries (i.e., the cost-transfer ratio).  However, how one interprets such a 
measure of cost effectiveness for policy purposes depends on what goes into calculating 
                                                 
1 For example, Grosh (1994, 46) states that “Concern over high administrative costs is perhaps the reason 
that is most commonly given for not adopting targeted programs.” 2 
it:  for example, it depends on whether or not it includes the fixed costs of setting up the 
program (or just recurring costs), the average size of transfers, the duration of the 
program, and whether the program is expanding over time or is now a “mature” program.  
Detailed knowledge of such ingredients is a prerequisite for interpreting such numbers 
and for any sensible comparison with other programs.  Therefore, in this paper we also 
analyze the cost structure of the program and not just aggregate cost levels. 
While focusing on cost-transfer ratios (CTRs) is adequate for programs whose 
objective is simply to disburse funds, in practice, programs obviously have more 
ambitious objectives.  The ultimate objective of PROGRESA is to decrease both current 
and future poverty.  Two features of the program are especially important in this respect.  
Transfers are targeted to the poorest municipalities and to some of the most vulnerable 
households in these communities, especially households with children.  Receipt of 
transfers is also conditional on households investing in the nutritional, health, and 
education status of their children (i.e., their human capital).  Since both of these program 
activities require resources, there is an obvious potential trade-off between reducing costs 
and generating human capital benefits.  Improving the cost effectiveness of the program 
by reducing the CTR may not necessarily be desirable if it comes at the expense of the 
resources devoted to targeting or to monitoring compliance with the conditions set for 
participating in the program.
2  So interpreting the CTR as a measure of overall cost 
effectiveness can be misleading, especially in the context of programs like PROGRESA, 
which have multiple objectives.  For this reason, we refer to the CTR as a measure of 
“cost efficiency” and reserve the term “cost effectiveness” for when we incorporate the 
broader objectives of the program.  It is important to ensure that improvements in cost 
efficiency do not come at the expense of the program’s overall cost effectiveness.  This 
provides another motivation for looking at the structure of costs and not just cost levels. 
                                                 
2  Grosh (1994, 46) also says that “The conclusion that total administrative costs are low must be somewhat 
tempered, however. In several of the programs, it appears that low administrative budgets have led to 
deficient program management. Spending more on administration with a given program framework might 
lead to better service quality, better incidence, or both.” 3 
As indicated above, in this paper we are solely concerned with describing the 
detail required when analyzing and comparing costs.  Of course, one would ideally like to 
put these costs into perspective by, for example, comparing them to program benefits or 
the costs and benefits of other programs.  To compare different designs of the current 
program would require measures of benefits and costs for each of the alternative designs.  
To compare this program to other programs would require measures of benefits and costs 
for each alternative program.  Unfortunately, very little exists in the way of impact 
analysis for other national programs and even less on costs.  It would also be very 
difficult to persuade a government to implement a program using different designs in 
different areas, never mind persuading them to evaluate them.  Undoubtedly, the need for 
investments that enable such comparisons is great, and we hope that the insights from the 
current paper help to highlight the issues that must be addressed on the cost side.  In a 
companion paper, Caldés, Coady, and Maluccio (2004) compare costs across similar 
programs recently implemented in other Latin American countries. 
The format of the paper is as follows.  In the next section, we present a brief 
description of the program.  In Section 3, we briefly highlight the important ingredients 
of any comprehensive evaluation of a program’s cost efficiency.  This is followed in 
Section 4 by a detailed analysis of program administrative costs.  Section 5 presents an 
analysis of private household costs, and these are combined with program costs for a 
discussion of their relative importance in total costs.  Section 6 summarizes the main 
points of the paper. 
2.  The Design and Implementation of PROGRESA 
In recent years increasing emphasis has been placed on the role of human capital 
in stimulating economic growth and social development.  Investing in the human capital 
of poor households is also widely believed to be crucial to alleviating poverty over the 
long term.  However, recognition is also growing of the need for effective social safety 
nets to protect poorer households from poverty and malnutrition during the push for more 4 
broad-based economic growth.  For example, according to the World Bank (1997), 
investing in basic social services and protecting the vulnerable constitute two of the five 
fundamental tasks of government.
3  Others have also emphasized that effective social 
safety nets can have a positive influence on economic growth (Ravallion 2003). 
Recently governments in developing countries, particularly in Latin America, 
have introduced innovative programs that attempt to integrate these objectives.  One of 
the first programs of this type was PROGRESA, introduced in Mexico in August 1997. 
PROGRESA had a total annual budget in 2000 of around $800 million, equivalent to just 
below 20 percent of the Federal poverty alleviation budget or 0.2 percent of GDP.  This 
program, designed and implemented by the Federal government, has a number of key 
design features.
4  Participating communities and households are selected by program 
officials, who are situated in the central government, and transfers go directly to eligible 
households without passing through state budgets.  It was hoped that this would eliminate 
the unnecessary bureaucracy inherent in many existing programs.  The program uses a 
range of targeting methods (e.g., geographic, household proxy means, and community 
targeting methods) to ensure that program benefits reach the poorest households.  
Continued eligibility to receive benefits is conditional on households investing in the 
education and health status of household members, in particular children.  Failure to meet 
these conditions leads to a loss of benefits, often temporarily at first but eventually 
permanently. 
 
                                                 
3 The other three roles identified are establishing a foundation of law, maintaining a nondistortionary policy 
environment and macroeconomic stability, and protecting the environment.  It also argues that: “Public 
policies and programs must aim not merely to deliver growth but to ensure that the benefits of market-led 
growth are shared, particularly through investments in basic education and health.  They must also ensure 
that people are protected against material and personal insecurity.”  Similarly, in his Prebish lecture, 
Stiglitz (2000, 31-32) identifies education and health as key priority areas in all developing countries’ 
development strategies. 
4  See Skoufias (2005) for a detailed description of the program and a synthesis of the results from a wide 
range of program impact evaluations and Coady (2004a) for a broad discussion of the concept, 
implementation, and evaluation of the program. 5 
Description of the Program 
As pointed out above, a key feature of the program is that it is not simply a cash 
transfer program.  Before the transfer takes place, beneficiaries must undertake a number 
of actions directed toward improving the nutrition, health, and education status of 
household members, especially of children.  This essentially transforms the program from 
a pure cash transfer to a subsidy for human capital investments by households.  The 
transfers have two components:  a food transfer and an education and health transfer.  
Only children over seven years were eligible for education transfers (the starting age for 
Third Grade).  Transfers increase by grade and are higher for girls than for boys in 
middle school (grades 7-9).  In 1999, monthly benefits started at 80 pesos in grade 3 of 
primary school.
5  In middle school, benefits rose to 265 pesos for boys and 305 pesos for 
girls by grade 9.  Transfers are also conditional on an 85 percent attendance record and 
children are allowed to repeat a grade at most twice. 
The “food transfer” was fixed for each family at 125 pesos per month and was 
conditional on households making regular trips to health clinics for a range of 
preventative health checks as well as attending monthly nutrition and hygiene 
information sessions.  In principle, the education and food transfers are independent in 
the sense that beneficiaries can take up one and not the other.  In addition to the cash 
transfer, beneficiary households with children of less than three years receive a monthly 
nutritional supplement that contains essential micronutrients (a box of 30 sachets per 
month). 
The ceiling for education and health transfers is 750 pesos.  On average, the 
transfer to beneficiary households was substantial, constituting around 20 percent of total 
household consumption.  The money was given to the mothers, reflecting the belief that 
mothers are more likely to maximize the benefits of the extra income by spending it for 
children’s welfare.  Transfers are also inflation-indexed every six months. 
 
                                                 
5  In 1999 the exchange rate was approximately 10 pesos per U.S. dollar. 6 
Implementation of the Program 
PROGRESA is implemented in two distinct stages.  In the first stage, the most 
marginal rural localities were identified using a specially constructed “marginality index” 
based mainly on data from the national census.  Based on this marginality index, selected 
localities are visited to ensure that they do indeed have access to the required supporting 
infrastructure in the form of schools and health clinics.  In the second stage, households 
in eligible localities were selected, using locality census data to classify households as 
“poor” or “nonpoor,” based on a statistical analysis of household income and other 
characteristics.  Once beneficiary households are identified, a general assembly is held to 
incorporate households into the program and to inform them of their responsibilities and 
rights and, more generally, of the objectives and functioning of the program. 
The expansion of the program across localities took place in phases.  The data 
collection for the first and second phases of PROGRESA began in October 1996, and 
these data were used to develop the statistical model for classifying households as poor or 
nonpoor and thus their eligibility to participate in the program (i.e., household targeting).  
As shown in Table 1, Phase 1 began in August 1997, when 140,544 households in 3,369 
localities were incorporated, with the first transfers taking place during September-
October 1997.  Phase 2 of the program began in November 1997, when a further 160,161 
households in 2,988 localities were incorporated, with the first transfers taking place in 
January 1998.  For the most part, expansion of the program over time has been 
determined by budget allocations, with the greatest expansion occurring in 1998 (i.e., 
Phases 3 to 6) when nearly 1.63 million families in 43,485 localities were incorporated.  
By Phase 11, the final phase of the program in early 2000, the program included nearly 
2.6 million families in 72,345 localities in all 31 states.  This constitutes about 40 percent 
of all rural families and one-ninth of all families in Mexico. 
Table 1—Expansion of PROGRESA over time 
Item  Phase 1  Phase 2  Phase 3  Phase 4  Phase 5  Phase 6  Phase 7  Phase 8  Phase 9  Phase 10  Phase 11 

























































Localities incorporated  3,369  2,988  4,334 25,568 5,432 8,151  3,290 9,758  2,801  6,523  131 
Households incorporated  140,544  160,161  141,211  1,000,496  65,303  422,317  96,372  283,818  26,389  251,778  5,670 
Cumulative  families  140,544  300,705  441,916  1,444,412 1,507,715 1,930,032  2,026,404  2,310,222  2,336,611 2,588,389 2,594,059 



























Notes:  The treatment and control samples (506 localities and 24,000 households) used for the evaluation of program impact were taken from Phase 2.  See Skoufias (2005) for 
more detail and a synthesis of the impact results.  The control households were incorporated during Phases 10 and 11. 
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3.  The Ingredients of a Cost Analysis 
Interpreting cost data or using them for comparisons across programs depends on 
what goes into calculating these numbers.  Undertaking a comprehensive cost analysis 
requires one to go beyond identifying the total program budgetary costs.  For policy 
purposes, one needs transparency with regard to the details of cost items that have been 
included in the aggregate cost.  It is also useful to identify how costs have changed over 
the life of the program.  For the purposes of cost analysis, costs should be distinguished 
according to 
•  Whether they are incurred in cash or in-kind.  Costs can involve either financial 
costs (e.g., salaries, user charges, or travel costs) or opportunity costs (e.g., time 
or “unpaid” personnel costs from outside the program or of volunteers).  Often the 
latter are wrongly overlooked. 
•  Who incurs the cost?  Costs can be categorized as program, private, or social 
costs.  Program costs are those financed out of the program budget (e.g., 
administrative salaries); private costs are costs borne by beneficiaries (e.g., travel 
costs); and social costs are those borne by others (e.g., by other government 
departments or by nonbeneficiary volunteers).  All of these can be incurred either 
as financial or as opportunity costs.  Often too much attention is focused on 
program costs relative to private or social costs. 
•  The timing of costs. Fixed costs are usually incurred at the start of the program 
before any “output” is produced, and thus they do not vary as output varies. These 
costs are often irretrievable (i.e., “sunk”) once incurred.  As the program evolves 
one expects average fixed costs to converge to zero.  The size of variable (or 
recurring) costs, on the other hand, depends on the scale of the program.  Over 
time one expects average program costs to converge to average variable costs.  
One also needs to distinguish between set-up costs, which tend to be sunk costs, 
and capital costs (e.g., equipment), which are “used” over the life of the program. 9 
Breaking costs down into these categories is a helpful mechanism for ensuring 
that important costs are not ignored and that any evaluation is useful, transparent, and 
accessible.  Categorizing costs is also important in that not all costs are relevant to all 
policy questions. One must also focus on “incremental costs,” i.e., the extra costs brought 
about by the introduction of the program. 
4.  The Cost Structure of PROGRESA 
In this section we present our cost analysis of PROGRESA.  We start by 
explaining how the data on program costs were collected, processed, and analyzed.  We 
then do the same for private costs.
6 
Program Costs 
When analyzing program costs, cost data are typically presented with annual 
program costs broken down by standard accounting activities (Table 2).  Based on the 
total cost and transfer data, one can calculate the cost-transfer ratio (CTR) for the 
program to date as 0.106, implying that it costs 10.6 pesos in program costs for every 100 
pesos transferred to households.  Or, equivalently, 9.6 percent of the total budget is 
absorbed by program costs.
7 
                                                 
6 We do not include social costs in the analysis because on the whole these are not thought to be 
particularly important for PROGRESA since the government had already previously invested heavily on 
the supply side.  In any case, data are not available (for example, on the extra time devoted by teachers and 
health clinic staff to “processing” and serving beneficiaries).  Such costs can be expected to be more 
substantial in countries where the supply side in targeted areas requires substantial investments.  Note that 
ideally one would like to compare various resource costs (such as time and money) in “control” and 
“treatment’ areas. 
7 Note that to get the total welfare impact of the program one would need to adjust for imperfect targeting 
performance—that some of the transfers “leak” to the nonpoor population.  In this paper, we focus 
exclusively on administrative costs and ignore these leakage costs.  But see Coady (2001, 2004b) for an 
evaluation of the targeting performance of PROGRESA and other social safety net programs. 10 
Table 2—Disaggregated program costs (’000 pesos) 
Accounting cost records  1997  1998  1999  2000  Total 
Honoraries and commissions  -  26,432  43,910  37,900  108,242 
Salaries -  32,295  77,220  81,800  191,315 
Materials and supplies  -  28,610  37,005  24,217  89,832 
Basic services  1,565  25,327  93,137  127,133  247,161 
Rental and lease payments  -  1,837  2,207  1,491  5,535 
Training, information and reports  -  40,893  10,384  38,695  89,972 
Commercial and bank services  -  6,853  5,186  4,987  17,026 
Maintenance of computer equipment  -  97  679  748  1,525 
Maintenance of other equipment, buildings  -  6,487  5,709  4,446  16,642 
Dissemination of information  -  13,764  17,882  15,140  46,786 
Travel and subsistence  -  42,583  47,635  43,976  134,195 
Official services  -  9,909  3,421  6,442  19,772 
Other services  -  31  35  25  91 
Other state expenses  -  7,885  -  -  7,885 
Furniture and real estate  329  2,623  2,916  2,200  8,068 
Machinery, indl., telecom. equipment  16,016  13,638  2,409  3,080  35,142 
Vehicles 2,681  73  12,354  3,520  18,628 
Tools and parts  -  841  -  -  841 
Surveys 109,034  216,855  95,220  20,600  441,710 
Other expenses  76,421  -  -  -  76,421 
Total program costs  204,481  477,033  457,310  416,400  1,555,224 
Total cash transfers  152,365  1,494,388  5,252,266  7,756,876  14,655,895 
Cash-Transfer Ratios (CTRs)           
  Total program costs  1.342  0.319  0.087  0.054  0.106 
  Cumulative  1.342  0.414  0.165  0.106  - 
 
However, care must be taken in interpreting this ratio for a number of reasons.  
First, it contains some costs relating to an external program evaluation, which was a one-
off evaluation that did not influence the current program design or operations.  This 
evaluation should be distinguished from the ongoing internal evaluation of the program, 
the results of which have been continually fed back into the program decisionmaking 
process in order to improve current program design and operations.  Whereas the external 
evaluation can be viewed as a sunk fixed cost that will not be incurred again, the latter is 
a recurring activity.  Second, this ratio also includes capital costs, which need to be 
transferred from a stock expenditure to a flow expenditure.  Third, the cost number used 
also includes up-front fixed set-up costs.  As the program matures, average fixed costs 
will converge toward zero and the CTR will converge toward average variable costs. 11 
Since most fixed costs tend to be incurred at the start of the program, one may be 
able to estimate the CTR for the mature program and thus determine the relative 
importance of fixed costs by estimating the CTR for each year of the program separately.  
As the program matures one expects this CTR to decrease and converge toward average 
variable costs.  This is indeed what happens, with the CTR decreasing rapidly over the 
life of the program from a high of 1.342 in the first year to a low of 0.054 in the most 
recent year.  One can also use the evolution of the CTR over time to get some idea of the 
magnitude of the “overestimate” from basing program CTRs on snapshots of the program 
over time.  The final row of Table 2 presents the cumulative average CTR for the 
program.  Considering the sharp decline in annual CTRs, basing the average CTR on a 
snapshot of the program after two or three years would obviously substantially 
overestimate the CTR of the program by the end of 2000, when all beneficiary 
households had been included and the program nearing maturity.  This highlights the 
need to take great care when comparing CTRs across programs to ensure that such 
numbers are comparable. 
In general, one expects that the decreasing CTR will reflect both increasing 
transfers over time and decreasing costs due mainly to declining fixed costs.  In Table 2, 
note that while the former is true, with transfers increasing from 1,494 million pesos in 
1998 to 7,757 million pesos in 2000, the latter is not as pronounced.  Costs decrease only 
from 477 million pesos in 1998 to 416 million pesos in 2000.  This suggests that these 
numbers may still include a substantial portion of fixed costs, especially since we also 
know that the program was still expanding up to the year 2000.  Therefore, one expects 
that the estimated CTR of 0.054 for the mature program is probably an overestimate. 
One way to adjust further for the presence of fixed costs is to associate program 
costs with key program activities that occur at different stages of the program.  By 
focusing only on those activities that recur throughout the life of the program, one may 
get a better estimate of the CTR for the mature program.  Focusing on key program 
activities can also facilitate comparisons of CTRs across alternative program designs.  
For example, by identifying the costs associated with household targeting or with the 12 
conditions of the program, one can compare CTRs across programs with and without 
such targeting or conditions.  
Identifying Key Program Activities 
For the purpose of linking program costs to activities, we identify key program 
activities.   
1.  Selection of localities (or geographic targeting), which involves using the national 
census data to construct a locality “marginality index.”  This index was used to 
select the “poorest” localities to participate in the program. 
2.  Identification of beneficiaries (or household targeting), which involves the 
collection of household socioeconomic data (through community Encuesta de 
Características Socioeconómicas de los Hogares (ENCASEH) census surveys), 
processing these data, and validating the findings with community officials. 
3.  Incorporation of beneficiaries, which involves convening a beneficiary meeting in 
each community to inform participants of their rights and responsibilities under 
the program. 
4.  Certification of compliance, which involves distributing registration and 
attendance forms to schools and health clinics and collecting and processing these 
forms. 
5.  Delivery of cash transfers, which involves informing communities of the location 
and timing of cash deliveries and ensuring that the transfer process is carried out 
in a timely and orderly manner. 
6.  Other operational activities, including general program monitoring and 
evaluation activities.   
A more detailed description of each activity is presented in Table 3.   13 
Table 3—Description of program activities 
(i) Coordinate  with  education/health sectors:  Collect and process 
data from health and education ministries and the national 
census to determine which localities are eligible for the program, 
and which have access to a school and health clinic.  A 
marginality index is constructed for each locality with the most 
marginal selected for the program. 
(1) Selection of Localities 
These costs are incurred before any localities, 
or households within localities, are identified 
as being eligible for benefits and are thus 
independent of the number of households in the 
program or the level of household cash 
transfers.  (ii) Verify access to, and capacity to provide, education and health 
services:  Inform municipal governments of which localities 
were selected, confirm their access to adequate facilities, and 
consider others who may qualify. 
(i)  Collect household socioeconomic information:  Collect baseline 
ENCASEH surveys, including revisiting households to reassess 
beneficiary status. 
(ii)  Enter and process data:  These data are entered in PROGRESA’s 
central office. 
(2) Identification of Beneficiary Families 
These costs are also incurred prior to the 
incorporation of households from eligible 
localities into the program and are thus 
independent of the total number of households 
incorporated and the level of household 
transfers.  We associate these with household 
targeting. 
(iii) Identify households in extreme poverty:  This involves the 
application of discriminant analysis to baseline ENCASEH data. 
(i)  Print and distribute forms (and induction package):  Forms are 
handed to beneficiary households during the general assembly. 
(ii)  Organize and operate the process of incorporating families: Do 
advance preparation for and carry out general assemblies. 
(3) Incorporation of Families 
The magnitude of these costs is expected to 
increase with the number of localities and 
households incorporated into the program, but 
it is independent of the level of household 
transfers.  We associate these costs with the 
conditions imposed to obtain transfers. 
(iii) Collect forms from households:  Collect at first cash transfer and 
require proof of registration at schools and health clinics. 
(i) Confirm  school  registration/attendance:  Collect E2 forms from 
the various institutions.  The schools send these forms via the 
state personnel. 
(4) Certification of Fulfillment of 
Co-Responsibility Actions 
The magnitude of these costs increases with the 
total number of households but is independent 
of the level of transfers.  We associate these 
with program conditions. 
(ii)  Confirm health registration/attendance:  Collect S2 forms from 
the various institutions.  The health clinics send these forms via 
state personnel. 
(i)  Cost of transferring cash transfers:  Pay Telecomm for 
distributing cash transfers (fixed percent of transfers). 
(ii)  Verify/monitor cash transfers:  Set up and run cash transfer. 
(5) Delivery of Cash Transfers 
These costs increase with the number of 
households in the program and the level of 
household transfers.  (iii) Deliver and administer holograms needed by households to 
identify themselves as beneficiaries. 
(i)  Prepare monthly reports on education/health services. 
(ii)  Organize, collect, and process reports by PROGRESA. 
(iii) Support to beneficiary families:  Receive new applications for 
inclusion, changes in the beneficiary list, and other related 
operational activities. 
(6) Follow-up Services 
These costs are expected to increase with the 
number of localities and households in the 
program.  We treat them as being incurred 
regardless of whether transfers are targeted to 
poor households or conditional on human 
capital accumulation.  
(iv) Support to nonbeneficiaries:  Deal with requests for inclusion 
from households and localities, processing and filing this 
information. 
(7) Evaluation of Program 
These costs, excluding ENCEL surveys, are 
treated as part of the program costs. 
(i)  Analyze ENCEL and other surveys: Some undertaken in 
PROGRESA, some by IFPRI.  Collect ENCEL survey data for 
evaluation of program. 
 
Note that these activities have a natural sequential ordering.  The first three 
(selection of localities, identification of beneficiaries, and incorporation of families) are 14 
activities that must be undertaken up front before any cash transfers take place.  The 
selection of localities is a fixed (and sunk) cost that does not vary with the total size of 
the program (the number of beneficiary localities or households).
8  Therefore, this 
component of average fixed cost per peso transferred (or per household) will decrease as 
the program expands to include more localities and households or as the level of 
household transfers increases.  The identification and incorporation of families, however, 
involve costs that increase with the number of localities and households included in the 
program, but these costs are unrelated to the size of transfers.  The last three activities 
(certification of compliance, cash transfers, and program monitoring) recur throughout 
the life of the program and increase with the number of beneficiary households. 
The process of allocating costs to activities involves the following steps.  Based 
on the disaggregated cost data in Table 2, we first allocate some of these costs directly to 
certain activities.  For example, the cost of collecting surveys is allocated to 
“identification of beneficiaries” and “evaluation,” the former relating to the cost of the 
ENCASEH survey and the latter to the cost of the Encuesta Evaluation de los Hogares 
(ENCEL) surveys (see the notes to Table 4 for more details).
9  All remaining costs are 
then allocated to program activities, using the time allocation matrix set out in Table 4.  
We then combine both these expenditures to calculate the activity cost shares and their 
contribution to the CTR in Table 5. 
                                                 
8 Here we are referring primarily to the statistical analysis undertaken to develop and implement the 
geographic targeting algorithm to calculate the marginality index.  If additional costs, such as costs 
associated with verifying that potentially eligible localities satisfy other criteria such as having a certain 
minimum operational and service capacity, exist, then such costs can be expected to vary with the size of 
the program. 
9 Two adjustments are made to the accounting data before these are allocated.  First, since from the 
accounting data we can identify capital costs, we can also transform these expenditures into flows over the 
life of the assets.  Capital equipment is assumed to depreciate at the following annual rates: Furniture and 
real estate (10 percent), machinery and industrial and telecommunications equipment (30 percent) and 
vehicles (25 percent). 
Second, amounts are converted into constant year 2000 pesos using the following inflation factors:  
1997 = 1.5, 1998 = 1.3, and 1999 = 1.1. 15 
Table 4—Time allocation matrixes for program staff 
Activity 1997  1998  1999  2000 
Selection of localities  13.8  6.8  6.0  5.4 
Identification of beneficiaries  9.5  5.7  5.5  5.0 
Incorporation of beneficiaries  9.8  13.4  11.3  11.1 
Certification of responsibilities  19.5  31.2  33.9  34.2 
Delivery of cash transfers  17.9  15.3  14.8  15.0 
Follow-up services  22.5 20.8 21.9  20.2 
Evaluation 7.0  6.8  6.6  9.1 
Notes:  The above time matrixes are used to allocate program costs (excluding directly assigned costs) to 
program activities.  The program costs from Table 2 directly assigned to program activities are as 
follows.  (1) Basic services:  postal and telegraphic costs amounting to $1,042 for 1997, $22,996 for 
1998, $84,285 for 1999, and $124,100 for 2000 are allocated to delivery of cash transfers; 
(2) Training:  these include costs that are allocated to evaluation and also costs for information 
services that corresponds to some contracts for entry and processing survey data that are allocated 
to identification of beneficiaries, $8,623 for 1998 and $4,945.19 for 1999; (3) Travel:  International 
travel and subsistence costs of $303 for 1998, $208 for 1999, and $157 for 2000, are allocated to 
evaluation; (4) Surveys:  this refers to the cost of collecting the ENCASEH surveys (which are 
allocated to identification of beneficiaries) and ENCEL surveys (which are allocated to evaluation). 
 
 
Table 5—Activity cost shares and cost-transfer ratios (CTRs) 
Cost  share/CTR  1997 1998 1999 2000 Total 
Activity cost shares           
  Selection of localities  0.06  0.03  0.04  0.04  0.04 
  Identification of beneficiaries  0.61  0.47  0.26  0.03  0.34 
  Incorporation of families  0.04  0.07  0.07  0.08  0.07 
  Certification of responsibilities  0.08  0.16  0.21  0.24  0.18 
  Delivery of cash transfers  0.08  0.13  0.25  0.41  0.22 
  Follow-up services  0.10  0.11  0.13  0.14  0.12 
  Evaluation  0.03  0.03  0.04  0.06  0.04 
Activity CTRs           
  Selection of localities  0.074  0.010  0.003  0.002  0.004 
  Identification of beneficiaries  0.766  0.137  0.022  0.002  0.037 
  Incorporation of families  0.052  0.020  0.006  0.004  0.007 
  Certification of responsibilities  0.104  0.046  0.017  0.012  0.020 
  Delivery of cash transfers  0.106  0.036  0.021  0.021  0.024 
  Follow-up services  0.120  0.031  0.011  0.007  0.013 
  Evaluation  0.037  0.010  0.003  0.003  0.005 
Aggregate CTR  1.260  0.290  0.085  0.052  0.111 
 
Looking first at the activity cost shares in the table, the largest cost items are 
identification of beneficiaries (34 percent of total costs), delivery of cash transfers (22 
percent), and certification of responsibilities (18 percent).  The time profile of cost shares 16 
also reflects the sequential nature of these activities.  The cost share of identification of 
beneficiaries decreases from a high of 61 percent in 1997 to a low of 3 percent in 2000.  
The cost share of certification of responsibilities increases from a low of 8 percent in 
1997 to a high of 24 percent in 2000.  Similarly, the cost share of delivery of transfers 
increases from 8 percent in 1997 to 41 percent in 2000.  The substantial shift of cost 
shares toward recurring cost items is consistent with the program being very near 
maturity.  By 2000, the recurring activities (i.e., the last five activities) account for 85 
percent of total program costs in that year. 
The second panel in Table 5 presents CTRs for each activity, for each year, and 
for the overall program.
10  The CTR for the overall program is 0.111, and the costs 
associated with the key design features of PROGRESA are an important component of 
total costs and thus the aggregate CTR.  The costs associated with household targeting 
(identification of beneficiaries) account for 34 percent of total costs, while those 
associated with imposing conditions on transfers (incorporation of families and 
certification of responsibilities) account for 25 percent of total costs. 
It is obviously important that these costs, which substantially increase the CTR of 
the program, generate an adequate return.  In the context of targeting, this requires that 
costs incurred result in an adequate increase in the share of transfers reaching the poorest 
households, thus enhancing the impact of the program on current poverty.  Coady (2001) 
provides an in-depth analysis of the welfare gains from household targeting.  In the 
context of the conditions, this requires that the extra costs incurred result in an adequate 
improvement in human capital outcomes and thus in future poverty reductions.  Schultz 
(2004), Behrman and Hoddinott (2000), and Gertler (2000) provide detailed analyses of 
the education, nutrition, and health impacts of the program.  More generally, since 
monitoring compliance with the conditions constitutes a substantial share of total 
program costs, it is important that transfer levels are high enough to generate human 
                                                 
10  The difference between this average CTR and the ratio of 0.106 presented in Table 2 reflects the fact 
that we have now adjusted for inflation (which increases the CTR) and excluded external evaluation costs 
associated with the collection and processing of the ENCEL surveys used for the impact analyses. 17 
capital impacts that can compensate for the resulting higher CTR.  Higher transfer levels 
thus improve the program’s overall cost-effectiveness both through higher human capital 
benefits and a lower CTR, due to the larger transfer base. 
In Table 6, we present aggregate CTRs for different program designs.  The 
present program is a conditional-targeted program.  One can consider alternative 
programs that do not make transfers conditional or do not target households or either.  
Since both conditions and targeting require program resources (to monitor households 
behavior and to administratively select “poor” households within participating localities), 
the costs of implementing unconditional or untargeted programs will be lower than their 
conditional or targeted counterparts.  The costs associated with the identification of  
Table 6—Cost-transfer ratios, by program type 
Program type  Present  Long-run  Long-run (including recertification) 
Targeted/conditional 0.111  0.044  0.081 
Untargeted/conditional 0.074  0.044   
Targeted/unconditional 0.084  0.032  0.069 
Untargeted/unconditional 0.047  0.032   
 
 
beneficiaries are incurred only when household targeting is used; in the absence of 
targeting, we assume that there is no need to collect and analyze household data (from the 
ENCASEH surveys).  In the absence of conditions, there would be no costs incurred for 
incorporating households or certifying that they satisfy the conditions: incorporation is 
the process of providing households with information regarding their responsibilities and 
how the program operates, and certification is not necessary if there are no conditions. 
However, when one decides to make transfers conditional on certain actions by specific 
household members (children going to school, for example), this automatically involves 
some categorical targeting since transfers are linked to the demographic composition of 
households.  Only households with children in the relevant age groups are eligible for 
education transfers.  Therefore, it doesn’t really make sense to consider an untargeted-
unconditional program.  But we still present the CTRs for such a program simply because 18 
it helps to get a picture of the magnitude of targeting costs.  In the ratios discussed below, 
we assume that the costs of targeting are the same whether the targeting is based on a 
proxy-means test, categorical groups, or both. 
The CTR for the actual targeted/conditional program is 0.111; that is, it cost 11.10 
pesos to transfer 100 pesos to households.  In other words, administrative costs have 
absorbed around 10 percent of the total budget to date.  For a number of targeted poverty 
alleviation programs, Grosh (1994, 44–46) found that the share of administrative costs 
ranged from 0.4 to 29 percent, with a median of 9 percent.  For programs involving 
proxy-means tests, the median was 10 percent.  Given the relative complexity of 
PROGRESA as a poverty alleviation program, its administrative cost share of 0.111 
would appear to be quite acceptable, being just above the median for all programs and 
exactly equal to the median for programs targeted using proxy-means methods.  It is 
definitely low compared with the numbers given by Grosh (1994) for the LICONSA and 
TORTIVALES programs in Mexico, which imply program costs of 40 pesos and 14 
pesos per 100 pesos transferred, respectively.  But one must caution that it is hard to be 
confident of such comparisons, given that we are unclear about what exactly is included 
in the figures quoted in Grosh (1994).
11 
The relative complexity of the programs relates mainly to the decision to 
undertake proxy-means household targeting and to condition transfers on household 
actions.  As already pointed out, undertaking these program functions requires resources.  
The substantial drop in the CTR when transfers are either not targeted or not conditional 
neither reflects the large share of these costs in total program costs.  Dropping household 
targeting results in a decrease in the CTR from 0.111 to 0.074, a 33 percent fall.  
Dropping the conditions results in a decrease from 0.111 to 0.084, a 24 percent fall.  
Dropping both leads to a CTR of 0.047, a 58 percent fall. 
                                                 
11 Grosh (1994) discusses a range of difficulties associated with collecting and analyzing cost data for 
poverty alleviation programs.  She also states that one of the biggest drawbacks faced by her study was “the 
imprecision in calculating administrative costs” (p. 30). 19 
But these ratios include fixed costs, which become less important over time.
12  
Excluding these fixed costs (selection of localities, identification of beneficiaries, and 
incorporation of beneficiaries) enables us to estimate the long-run CTR of the program.  
This comes out to 0.044 for the actual targeted/conditional program; in other words, over 
time the cost of transferring 100 pesos to a beneficiary will converge to 4.40 pesos.  
Equivalently, over time the proportion of the total budget absorbed by administrative 
program costs will fall from 10 percent to only 4.2 percent.  This is comparable to the 
lowest numbers in the Grosh (1994) study referred to above.  One should note that the 
long-run CTR for the conditional program is the same, regardless of whether it is targeted 
or not.  This reflects the fact that all of the targeting costs are treated as fixed costs and do 
not enter recurring costs.  Therefore, whereas the gains from targeting are permanent (at 
least in a static sense) the costs of initial targeting become irrelevant over time.   
However, this implicitly assumes that there is no need for recertifying the 
socioeconomic status of households, which is almost certainly not valid.  Therefore, the 
long-run CTR for the (targeted) program is likely to be higher than the 0.044 estimated.  
In Table 5, we can see that the CTR for identification of beneficiaries was 0.037 over the 
life of the program.  This is likely to be an overestimate of the incremental cost of 
recertifying households.  But what we can say is that the long-run CTR for the program is 
probably somewhere between 0.044 and 0.081.  However, achieving the lower levels 
requires the program to continue over a long enough period.  In other words, ceteris 
paribus, programs requiring large set-up costs are only justified if the program is 
expected to continue for a reasonable time period or if there are substantial returns to 
these fixed costs in terms of poverty reduction or impacts on human capital.  
                                                 
12 Note that if the program is expected to continue into the future, then it makes sense to focus on the lower 
long-run cost as an indicator of cost efficiency.  However, for shorter programs, fixed costs are more 
important and it probably makes more sense to focus on the higher average cost.  This, of course, highlights 
a key issue with regard to the choice and design of programs that are intended to be temporary: one should 
avoid programs with large fixed costs.  In the context of PROGRESA, the willingness to incur these fixed 
costs reflected the clear intention that the program would be around for many years and would also 
eventually have national coverage. 20 
The long-run CTR for an unconditional program falls to 0.032 (or 0.069 if the 
“fixed” targeting costs are included), a decline of 27 percent.   This large decline reflects 
the fact that a large proportion of the costs associated with the conditions on transfers are 
recurring costs linked to the certification of responsibilities activity.  Since these costs 
persist throughout the life of the program, it is important also that the impacts on human 
capital also persist. 
5.  Private Costs 
In order to qualify for and collect transfers, households must incur private costs, 
including both financial and time costs.  To qualify for the food transfer, household 
members must make regular trips to health clinics for checkups and instruction in health 
and nutrition.  So, in traveling to the clinic, households incur both financial and time 
costs as well as a time cost for attending the clinic.  To qualify for the education grants, 
children may also incur travel costs to go to and from school, and they may forgo 
earnings in order to attend school.  Also, beneficiaries must make bi-monthly trips to 
collect the cash transfers.   
In this section we analyze these costs in detail.  Whereas the program costs can be 
gathered from sources within PROGRESA, private costs (e.g., time, travel, forgone 
earnings, etc.) have to be estimated from survey data.  We use a combination of data 
sources (including the ENCEL surveys used for the impact evaluations, data collected as 
part of program operation and monitoring, the 1996 Encuesta Nacional de Ingreso-Gasto 
de los Hogares (ENIGH) surveys used to identify beneficiaries and as a baseline for the 
impact evaluations, time-allocation data, and locality-level data) to build up a picture of 
the composition and level of private costs.  Although we also discuss the total costs 
incurred by households as a result of these responsibilities, it is important to emphasize 
that, for the purpose of evaluating the program, only incremental costs are relevant; in 
other words, we should only include costs that would not have been incurred in the 21 
absence of the program.  In each of the sections below, we start by examining total 
private costs and then indicate how these can be adjusted to arrive at incremental costs. 
Food Transfers 
In order to qualify for the food transfer, household members must make a series 
of visits to health clinics for checkups and health lectures.  The required schedule of visits 
for the various household members is presented in Table 7.  From the table we can see 
that private costs will depend on the size and age composition of the family.   
Table 7—Family health attendance requirements 
Age group  Frequency of visits 
Less than 4 months  Two visits: at 7 and 28 days, and at 2 months 
From 4 to 24 months  Eight visits for nutrition and immunization: at 4, 6, 9, 12, 15, 18, 21, and 24 
months.  In addition, one monthly visit to measure weight and height. 
From 2 to 4 years  Three annual visits: one every 4 months 
From 5 to 16 years  Two annual visits: one every 6 months 
More than 17 years  One visit a year 
Source:  Various program documents.  See Skoufias (2005) for more detail 
Note:  Since children between 0 and 2 years must make 25 visits, we assume 12.5 visits per year. 
 
To calculate the financial cost of travel, for each household we calculate the 
annual number of return trips as follows.  We assume that the mother must accompany all 
children less than 17 years old to the clinic, thus incurring extra travel costs.  We further 
assume that children 0 – 2 years do not have to pay for the trip, that children 3 – 5 years 
pay half price, and that everyone over 5 years pays full price.  These factors are used to 
transform the number of “actual trips” into the number of “effective trips” (or fully paid 
trips) for each household.  The financial cost of trips for each household is then 
calculated as the number of effective trips times the cost of a return trip.   
For each household, the cost of a trip is taken as the median cost for their locality.  
If there is a health clinic in the neighborhood then these costs are assumed to be zero.  In 
Table 8, we see that nearly 92 percent of localities, accounting for nearly 86 percent of 
households, do not have a health clinic in their locality.  Household members on average  
Table 8—Private costs associated with health component, by state 
Guerrero  Hidalgo  Michoacán  Puebla  Queretaro  San Luis Potosí  Veracruz  Total 
 
Standard 















1  Trips by family (annual)  8.09   26.68  7.61   24.74   7.64   25.30  8.15   25.66  8.91   25.70  8.37   24.66  7.47   25.01  7.92   25.25 
2 
Actual trips (more than 5 years 
old)  7.25   24.72  6.80   23.23   6.86   23.73  7.25   23.90  7.84   24.13  7.50   23.16  6.70   23.48  7.07   23.64 
3 
Effective trips (year) by family 
(2-4 years = 0.5)  7.61   25.70  7.14   23.98   7.19   24.51  7.64   24.78  8.32   24.91  7.88   23.91  7.03   24.24  7.44   24.45 
4  Travel  time                    
    Single trip  82.42   122.83  92.44   127.78   62.53   96.00  85.09   142.45  40.18   87.14  76.45   112.76  78.70   115.88  80.11   118.24 
    Age group: 0 - 5 years old  172.99   139.78  165.42   101.86   130.28   88.28  233.68   163.96  104.29   81.58  157.05   100.60  148.27   105.80 170.77    114.25 
    Age group: 6 - 12 years old  207.68   165.28  206.62   159.18   187.90   155.36  249.05   215.44  130.91   126.70  201.14   145.04  178.11   152.64  204.00   163.64 
    Age group: 13 – 16 years old  127.87   78.65  123.19   79.10   130.88   84.99  154.69   101.16  87.80   66.58  128.42   75.50  122.15   81.34 129.96    82.91 
 
  Age group: 17 years old and 
more  185.60   120.99  182.31   110.70   167.20   101.73  261.19   158.12  149.49   109.86  189.36   114.06  185.96   114.17  197.68   119.83 
    Age group: 13 to 50 years old  338.92   373.34  321.19   358.72   336.78   350.83  423.06   494.32  218.16   302.25  330.95   361.95  325.86   367.97  346.75   382.23 
    Mothers  88.83   119.52  92.27   114.85   71.80   99.04  120.71   162.79  50.53   90.39  96.22   117.11  90.97   118.61  96.14   121.54 
    Fathers  78.43   97.02  82.54   102.12   67.86   89.32  100.64   135.49  42.63   75.83  78.40   100.14  72.55   100.41  81.11   103.76 
    Family  610.52   721.24  595.05   667.80   541.97   618.73  772.02   936.97  353.50   550.95  580.08   652.45  551.92   672.97  613.51   705.92 
5  Distance (kilometers)  3.23   3.77  3.74   4.58   3.42   4.80  3.41   4.87  3.11   2.96  4.13   3.94  6.33   4.29  4.37   4.37 
6  Cost per trip (pesos)  6.81   4.06  9.66   5.69   7.49   6.86  5.26   2.47  5.60   2.00  11.62   8.21  5.78   2.94  8.36   4.92 
7  Cost per trip (values > zero)  6.27   12.17  10.91   12.96   5.19   12.85  5.43   10.99  8.49   14.00  10.64   18.48  6.13   10.84  8.70   13.53 
8  Cost per effective trips (annual)  179.01   118.30  180.28   79.84   194.65   169.16  142.06   54.39  120.72   37.02  236.66   162.85  120.48   55.37  178.67   95.71 
9  Waiting time (minutes)  27.34   37.36  18.44   38.08   15.33   44.56  24.07   34.80  11.00   20.36  26.00   52.04  25.50   38.77  23.31   40.21 
10  Consult  time  (minutes)   20  20  20  20  20  20    20  20 
11  Pláticas  time  (minutes)   60  60  60  60  60  60    60  60 
12  % localities without clinic   85.7% 86.6% 91.1% 100.0%  85.7% 94.4%   91.4% 91.6%
13  % families or households    10.2% 17.8% 12.4% 16.7%  4.3% 15.2%  23.4% 100.0%
14  % families without clinic   73.5% 71.6% 86.3% 100.0%  73.8% 92.4%   89.8% 85.9%
Sources:  Household data sets collected for program targeting and operations (ENCASEHs) and for program impact evaluations (ENCELs), various years. 
Notes:  The average persons, by age group:  0-5 years (0.99), 6-12 years (1.45), 13-16 years (0.74), 17+ years (1.05), mother (1.06), father (0.91), and 13-50 years (3.37).  Total 




make just over 25 trips per year, most of these obviously being accounted for by the two 
monthly trips made by mothers.  The average distance traveled to the clinic is 4.37 
kilometers, rising to 5.12 kilometers when zeros are excluded.  The average cost of a 
return trip is 4.92 pesos, rising to 13.53 pesos when zeros are excluded.  We calculate that 
the total annual travel cost is, on average, 95.70 pesos per family. 
Households also incur time costs in traveling to and from the clinic, in waiting to 
be seen for a checkup, in attending the checkup itself, and in attending the health and 
nutrition information sessions (platicas).  Time costs are derived as follows.  The travel 
time costs for each household are taken as the median travel time for households in the 
locality; note that these are zero when there is a health clinic in the locality but also zero 
if household members walk to the nearest health clinic.  Households also incur time costs 
while waiting to be attended to at the clinic and during the actual checkup.  The former is 
taken as the median of the relevant locality values given in the operations survey and the 
latter is assumed to be constant at 20 minutes for each checkup.  The platicas are 
assumed to last one hour, based on a talk time of 45 minutes.   
The average travel time to the clinic is just over 118 minutes per single return trip.  
The average annual travel time per household is just over 48 hours, equivalent to roughly 
4 hours each month; mother’s time accounts for about 68 percent of the travel time.  On 
average, households have to wait about 40 minutes to be seen for a checkup (or 
consultation).  In total, each month household members make on average 2.1 trips, each 
taking nearly 2 hours travel time. One of these is a platica, which takes 1 hour; the other 
1.1 trips, for checkups, incur a 40 minute waiting time and a 20 minute consultation time.  
So, on average, household members incur around 6.3 hours in time costs in order to meet 
health-clinic attendance requirements. 
Education Grants 
As with health visits, households incur both financial and time costs because 
children have to travel to and from school, attend school, and undertake homework.  The 24 
approach used to derive these costs are similar to those used for health visits.  The 
median time to travel to the nearest locality with a school and the cost of travel are 
charged to each household, both being zero if there is a school in the neighborhood. 
Financial costs are also zero if children walk to school.  These numbers are applied to all 
children enrolled in school.  For the primary level, it is assumed that all localities have a 
primary school so that travel time and money costs are approximately zero.   
From Table 9 we learn that secondary school children spend on average nearly 50 
minutes traveling to and from school, rising to nearly 100 minutes when zeros are 
excluded.  The average distance traveled to school is 1.94 kilometers, rising to 3.68 
kilometers when zeros are excluded.  This is consistent with many children having to 
travel substantial distances to attend secondary school.  In the sample, 17.3 percent of 
localities, accounting for 31.3 percent of secondary school children, have a secondary 
school.  The average cost of travel is 1.17 pesos per return trip, rising to 9.90 pesos when 
zeros are excluded.  On average then, households incur 316 pesos in school travel costs 
annually, rising to 1,980 pesos when zeros are excluded.   
Cash Transfers 
In principle, beneficiaries pick up their cash transfers once every two months.  
This implies both financial and time travel costs plus the time costs associated with 
waiting in line for the transfer.  The procedure for calculating these costs is the same as 
that described above for health and education.  Each household is allocated the median 
time and financial costs for their locality, assuming six trips per year.  Table 10 shows 
that only 1.13 percent of localities, accounting for 2.79 percent of households, have a 
distribution point located in them.  The average distance to a distribution point is 9.64 
kilometers, rising to 9.83 kilometers when zeros are excluded.  We find that households 
on average spend around 138 minutes traveling to and from transfer distribution points, at 
an average cost per return trip of 14.37 pesos per return trip.  This implies a household on 
average incurs 75 pesos annually in travel costs, rising to 113 pesos when zeros are  
Table 9—Private costs associated with secondary education, by state 
Guerrero  Hidalgo  Michoacán  Puebla  Queretaro  San Luis Potosí  Veracruz  Total 
 
Standard 















1  Travel time to school (minutes)  63.53  49.55  63.50  51.12 44.69  38.46 77.95  66.15 45.38  59.91 31.58  18.67  61.09  61.33 60.49  49.33
2  Travel cost to school (constant 
pesos November of 1999)  -  -  4.03  1.59 3.47  1.50 4.13  1.89 2.81  2.29 2.82  0.47  2.17  1.02 3.21  1.17
3 Distance  (kilometers)  2.27  2.36  1.58  1.63 1.59  2.10 1.61  1.88 1.30  3.00 1.70  1.13  1.81  2.28 1.77  1.94
4 Percent  students    7.5  18.80   14.30   15.60   3.40   14.40   26.00   100.0 
5 
Percent students living in 
localities with school (over 
total students in secondary)    33.2    38.80   26.90   28.00   0.00   59.20    18.50   31.30
6  Percent localities with 
secondary school    10.5    17.2    13.3    12.5    0.0    44.4    7.2    17.3 
Sources:  Household data sets collected for program targeting and operations (ENCASEHs) and for program impact evaluations (ENCELs), various years. 
 
Table 10—Private costs associated with collecting cash transfers, by state 
   Guerrero Hidalgo  Michoacán Puebla Queretaro  San Luis Potosí Veracruz  Total 
  
Standard 
















1  Travel time (minutes)  110.31   148.33    91.00    138.26    55.47    99.00   136.80   172.09    80.52    120.71    73.14   135.93    90.29   140.19    94.97    137.74 
2  Travel cost (pesos)  14.05    12.11    12.46    14.07    12.51    18.63     11.76     9.17    13.77   11.86    15.01     21.07    13.69     11.45    13.76    14.37 
3  Distance (kilometers)  4.36    7.04  4.46     7.91  5.44    9.66   4.25     6.51  4.68     6.09  9.47     14.09  7.58     11.45  6.90     9.64 
4  Frequency of visits to cash 
transfer locality                         
 Daily     1.36      0.97     1.28      2.14      2.15    0.35    0.92      1.18 
 Weekly     39.43     19.90     27.58    19.36    20.43      17.73      16.45     21.63 
 Every 15 days     9.62      7.80     12.03    14.83      4.30      10.83    6.21      9.66 
 Monthly     6.37      6.99     10.33      5.27      2.51    8.21    5.98      6.85 
 By chance     16.26     25.10     15.23    12.52    11.47      16.16      22.14     18.20 
 Only for transfers     24.39     37.04     31.20    42.92    56.63      45.07      41.92     39.16 
 Not responding     2.57      2.19     2.34      2.97      2.51    1.66    6.38      3.31 
 Total    100.00     100.00    100.00    100.00     100.00    100.00    100.00     100.00 
5  Percent beneficiaries living at 
pay  points   0  1.38  0   0   1.17   0.14  0.09  2.79
6  Percent localities with pay 
point   0  0.31  0   0   0.31   0.31  0.31  1.13




excluded.  We also find that nearly 40 percent of households make at least monthly trips 
to these locations for various reasons. 
Incremental Costs 
Up to this point we have focused on the total costs incurred by beneficiary 
households in meeting the conditions attached to the program (attending health clinics 
and schools and collecting transfers at distribution points).  However, some of these costs 
would have been incurred in the absence of the program.  For example, some mothers 
already make regular trips to the health clinics or to the area where the clinic is situated, 
some children already attend school, and beneficiaries may make regular trips to the 
location where benefits are distributed.  So for many households, the introduction of the 
program may have negligible implications for the total costs incurred.  In this section, we 
adjust the total costs to arrive at the incremental costs incurred due to the introduction of 
the program. 
We focus exclusively on the financial cost of travel, since these are the costs that 
were easy to monetize.  This is equivalent to assuming that the opportunity cost of time is 
zero, consistent with the household being able to sufficiently substitute time between 
activities so that only the most unproductive tasks are not undertaken.  We now discuss 
the relative magnitudes of these costs for health, education, and the collection of 
transfers. 
Health 
We have already determined that the total average cost of trips per family is 95.70 
pesos per year. Households receive 125 pesos per month in food transfers, equal to a 
1,500 pesos annual transfer.  This means that households incur travel costs of 6.38 pesos 
per 100 pesos received.  However, this is a substantial overestimate of the incremental 
private costs, since this cost is only additional for the extra trips brought about by the 
program.  According to Gertler (2000), the program brought about a 30–50 percent 
increase in the number of trips.  Using an estimate of a 40percent increase, this implies 27 
that only 28.6 percent of total trips are additional.  This in turn implies that the 
incremental private costs of receiving the food transfer are 1.82 pesos per 100 pesos 
received. 
Education 
Based on the school calendar, the private costs discussed earlier imply an annual 
cost of around 316 pesos.  If a household receives 217 pesos per school month, this gives 
them 2,170 pesos per year.  Both these numbers imply that households on average incur 
14.60 pesos for every 100 pesos of education grants received.  However, as with the 
health costs, this is a substantial overestimate of the incremental cost due to the program 
since most of these travel costs would have been incurred in its absence.  Based on 
Schultz (2004), we assume that the program brings about an 8.2 percent increase in 
enrollment levels at secondary school from a starting average enrollment rate of around 
70 percent, so that only 10 percent of travel costs are additional.  Using this number we 
can then calculate that households spend, on average, only an additional cost of 1.50 
pesos per 100 pesos received.  This number implicitly assumes that the opportunity cost 
of children’s time is zero, on average, which is consistent with the findings of Skoufias 
and Parker (2001). 
Cash Transfers 
The average transport costs incurred to collect transfers were earlier calculated as 
75.20 pesos per year.  Households on average receive 219 pesos monthly in education 
grants (over 10 months) and 125 pesos in food transfers, giving an average annual 
household transfer of 3,900 pesos.  This implies that households incur a cost of 1.90 
pesos per 100 pesos received.  Adjusting for the fact that these trips are additional for 
only 60 percent of households, this implies a private cost of 1.20 pesos per 100 pesos 
received. 28 
Total Costs 
In this section we aggregate across program and private costs in order to get some 
idea of the relative magnitude of the latter.  Whereas program costs are relevant to the 
total transfer a household receives, this is not so for all private costs, since the private 
costs associated with attending health clinics are relevant only for the consumption 
transfer and the private costs associated with secondary school attendance are relevant 
only for the secondary grants.  We assume that private costs associated with primary 
school are zero. The private costs associated with collecting transfers are relevant to the 
total transfer.  To aggregate program and private costs, we use the following transfer 
shares: a food/health share of 35 percent and a secondary schooling share of 41 percent.  
Also, the private health and schooling costs are relevant only for the program with 
conditions, and, since they are recurring, they enter into both the average CTR and the 
long-run CTR. 
The average CTR, including both program and private costs, lies in the range of 
0.059 to 0.136, depending on the program being considered (Table 11).  Focusing on the 
actual targeted/conditional program, the average CTR increases to 0.136 when private  
Table 11—Average and long-run program and private costs 
Program type  Average CTR  Long-run CTR 
Targeted/conditional  Program = 0.111 
Private = 0.025 (Share=18%) 
Total = 0.136 
Program = 0.044 
Private = 0.025 (Share = 36%) 
Total = 0.069 
Targeted/unconditional  Program = 0.084 
Private = 0.012 (Share = 13%) 
Total = 0.096 
Program = 0.032 
Private = 0.012 (Share = 27%) 
Total = 0.044 
Untargeted/unconditional  Program = 0.047 
Private = 0.012 (Share = 20%) 
Total = 0.059 
Program = 0.032 
Private = 0.012 (Share = 27%) 
Total = 0.044 
Note:  In constructing private costs, we weight the CTRs for the health and education components of 
beneficiary transfers by their transfer shares.  For example, the total private cost for the actual 
targeted/conditional program is calculated as 
(Health = 0.018*0.35) + (Secondary Education = 0.015*0.41) + (Collection = 0.012) = 0.025. 
Private costs associated with the primary school transfer are assumed to be zero since all 
communities have a primary school.  The private costs associated with health and education are only 
incurred for the conditioned program and, since they are recurring, they enter into both the average 
and long-run CTR. 29 
costs are included.  Private costs account for 18 percent of total costs.  In this respect, 
ignoring private costs will obviously lead to a substantial underestimate of total program 
costs.  So, for every 100 pesos transferred to households, administrative and private costs 
amount to 13.6 pesos.  The importance of private costs for the average CTR holds over 
all the program types considered, ranging from 13 percent for the targeted/unconditional 
program to 20 percent for the untargeted/unconditional program. 
Turning to the long-run total CTR of the program, it should be clear that the share 
of private costs will increase since the CTR based only on program costs always falls.  
The share of private costs in the total CTR now lies in the range of 27 percent for the 
unconditional programs to 36 percent for the actual targeted/conditional program.  
Therefore, focusing on the actual targeted/conditional program, we can say that the share 
of private costs in the total CTR is expected to lie in the range of 18 to 36 percent. Even 
for the least complex program considered—the untargeted/unconditional program—the 
share of private costs in the total CTR can be expected to lie in the range of 20 to 27 
percent, which is still quite substantial.  It is clear then that ignoring private costs can lead 
to a substantial underestimate of the total cost of transferring money to households under 
these transfer programs. 
6.  Conclusions 
As we stated in the beginning, it is commonly argued that the administrative costs 
associated with transferring income to poor households can be very large, thus 
substantially reducing the impact on poverty of the overall poverty alleviation budget.  
However, we also pointed out that the empirical evidence on administrative costs is 
limited, which severely limits our ability to verify their importance.  In addition, the few 
numbers available are not always comparable, and lack of detail about what has been 
included in such numbers means that one needs to be extremely careful in making 
comparisons. 30 
The aim of this paper is to help close the large gap that exists with regard to 
empirical knowledge of the cost structures of poverty alleviation programs.  In the 
context of PROGRESA, a large poverty alleviation program introduced in Mexico, we 
show how available cost data can be used to evaluate the cost efficiency of the program.  
The analysis also helps to reinforce the view that the numbers one ends up with can differ 
depending on how they are calculated. And how one interprets them or uses them for 
comparison across alternatives also depends on how they are calculated.  Very different 
numbers emerge when one takes snapshots of programs at different stages (say, after two 
years or after five years) and whether one includes or excludes up-front, set-up, or fixed 
costs.  For example, fixed costs are typically a more important component of total 
program costs earlier in the life of the program.  Over time, average fixed costs converge 
to zero, so that the average cost-transfer ratio (or, equivalently, share of administrative 
costs in total costs) converges to the ratio of recurrent operating costs to total transfers (or 
to their share in total costs). 
PROGRESA targets transfers to the most marginal rural communities in Mexico 
and to households classified as poor within these communities.  These transfers are also 
conditional on beneficiaries undertaking a number of actions intended to increase their 
human capital and thus generate a sustained decrease in poverty (such as regular 
attendance at health clinics and school).  Both these dimensions of program design 
require additional program resources to be put into effect, thus increasing the 
administrative cost of the program.  Therefore, the program is much more complex 
administratively than many existing transfer programs.  We estimated here that, four 
years after its implementation, administrative costs have accounted for 10 percent of total 
program costs.  Also, we estimate that this share should converge toward 4.2 percent over 
time, reflecting the size of upfront fixed costs.  This level of administrative cost seems 
relatively low compared with that for other programs in Latin America and Mexico, 
especially given its complex design.  As expected, the costs associated with targeting and 
imposing conditions on transfers are substantial, together accounting for more than half 
of total program costs.  Other studies have also shown that the additional resources 31 
devoted to these activities have generated substantial returns in terms of increasing the 
share of the transfers that reach poor households and in generating substantial 
improvements in nutrition, health, and education outcomes among these poor 
populations. 
In this paper we also emphasize the potential importance of the incremental 
private costs incurred by households who participate in the program, especially for 
conditional programs.  We estimated that these private costs are substantial in 
PROGRESA, accounting for 18 percent of total (program plus private) costs.  Over the 
long run, reflecting the fact that they are associated with recurring household activities, 
these costs become more important, converging to 36 percent of total costs.  These high 
shares confirm that ignoring private costs can lead to a substantial underestimate of the 
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